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Motivated by recent studies that show female CFOs are more risk averse than 
male CFOs when making various corporate decisions, we examine whether banks 
take into consideration the gender of CFOs when pricing bank loans. We find that 
in our sample, firms under the control of female CFOs on average enjoy about 
11% lower bank loan price than firms under the control of male CFOs. In 
addition, loans given to female CFO-led companies have longer maturities and are 
less likely to be required to provide collateral than loans given to male CFO led 
companies. Our results are robust to a series of robustness tests, such as a firm and 
year-fixed effect regression, a Heckman two-stage self selection model, a 
propensity score match method and a differences-in-differences approach. 
Overall, our results suggest that banks tend to recognize the role of female CFOs 
in providing more reliable accounting information ex ante and reducing default 
risk ex post, and grant firms with female CFOs lower loan price and more 
favourable contract terms. 
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Vaikuttaako yrityksen rahoitusjohtajan sukupuoli 
pankkiluottojen ehtoihin? 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 18/2011 
Bill Francis – Iftekhar Hasan − Qiang Wu 




Tuoreiden tutkimusten mukaan naispuoliset yritysten rahoitusjohtajat kaihtavat 
päätöksenteossaan riskejä enemmän kuin miespuoliset rahoitusjohtajat. Tässä tut-
kimuksessa otetaan nämä tulokset lähtökohdaksi ja haetaan empiiristä näyttöä ole-
tukselle, että pankkilainaa hakevan yrityksen rahoitusjohtajan sukupuoli vaikuttaa 
pankkilainan ehtoihin, erityisesti lainan hintaan. Tutkimuksessa käytetystä otok-
sesta saatujen estimointitulosten mukaan yritys, jonka rahoitusjohtaja on nainen, 
saa pankilta lainaa keskimäärin 11 % halvemmalla kuin yritys, jonka rahoitus-
päätöksistä vastaa mies. Pankkien myöntämien yrityslainojen maturiteetti lisäksi 
pitenee ja lainoille vaaditaan todennäköisesti vähemmän vakuuksia, kun yrityksen 
rahoitusjohtaja on nainen. Estimointitulosten murtumispisteitä etsitään vaihto-
ehtoisilla tilastollisilla testeillä ja estimointimenetelmillä. Estimoituun malliin ote-
taan yhtäältä mukaan yritys- ja vuositason kiinteät vaikutukset. Toisaalta työssä 
testataan Heckmanin kaksivaiheisen menetelmän avulla valikointiharhan merki-
tystä estimointitulosten kannalta. Lisäksi malli estimoidaan myös kahdella muulla 
menetelmällä: ”prospensity scrore matching” sekä ”difference-in-difference”. Tut-
kimustuloksia voidaan kaiken kaikkiaan tulkita niin, että pankit luottavat enem-
män naispuolisten rahoitusjohtajien antamaan etukäteistietoon yrityksen tulokses-
ta ja uskovat naisjohtajan pienentävän luottojen takaisinmaksuun liittyviä riskejä. 
Pankit ovat näin ollen valmiita myöntämään luottoa edullisemmin ehdoin niille 
yrityksille, joiden rahoitusjohtaja on nainen. 
 
Avainsanat: rahoitusjohtaja, sukupuoli, kirjanpitoinformaatio, pankkiluotot 
 
JEL-luokittelu: M41, G21, J16  
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Over  the past decade, the num ber  of fe male  CFOs has increased dram atically.  For 
example, the total number of female CFOs in S&P 1,500 companies was only 4 in 1994, 
and  it was 104 in 2006. 
1 This  significant in crease  of  female  CFOs has attrac ted 
considerable  attention  from  academics.  An em erging  stream  of lite rature  begins  to 
investigate the systematic differences between male and female CFOs in term s of their 
accounting, financing and invest ment decision-making. For instance, prior studies find 
that firms with female CFOs adopt more conservative accounting policies (Francis et al. 
(2010)),  report higher quality earnings (P eni  (2008)), are less likely to m anipulate 
earnings (Wei and Xie (2009) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010)), and are less likely to 
make significant acquisitions and m ore likely to reduce leverage level than f irms with 
male CFOs (Huang and Kisgen (2010)). In this  paper, we extend this line of research by 
examining whether the gender of CFOs affects  the cost of debt capital in the context of 
bank loans. 
We focus on bank loans for two prim ary reasons. First, bank loans are a m ajor 
source of corporate financing, even for larg e public companies. E ach year, the sheer 
volume of bank loan financing is much larger than equity and bond financing.
2 Given the 
economic significance of bank loans in allocatin g capital to corporations as well as the 
growing number of female CFOs, it is very  important to understand whether the gender 
of CFOs affects the cost of bank loans. 
                                                 
1 Data source: ExecuComp. 
2 For example, according to the Loan Pricing Association and Federal Reserve System, in 2005 the total 
amount of equity issua nce was about 115 billion U.S. dollars and the t otal amount of corporate bond 
issuance was about 700 billion, while the total amount of bank loan issuance was 1,500 billion U.S. dollars. 8 
 
Second,  accounting inform ation  is a persiste nt  standard that banks rely on to 
assess borrowers’ credit risk (e .g., Anderson et al. (2004) a nd Armstrong et al. (2010)). 
Prior studies find that when banks initiate private debt, they are very sensitive to various 
attributes of accounting information, such as operating accrual (Bharath et al. (2008)) and 
conservatism (Sunder et al. (2009) and Zhang  (2008)). Assuming female CFOs are more 
likely to report high quality and conservative earnings than male CFOs as documented in 
prior studies, as inside lenders with in-dep th knowledge of thei r clients (e.g., Diamond 
(1984) and Fama (1985)), banks should realize the benefits of female CFOs in providing 
more  reliable and conservative accounting  information  to lenders. In addition, the 
incentives  of  female  CFOs to reduce f irms’  leverage level and m ake  less risky 
investments also indicate lower def ault risk of the firms (Strahan (1999)). Collectively, 
we conjecture that banks should consider th e gender effect and reward borrowers with 
female CFOs with lower bank loan price a nd more favorable non-price loan terms when 
designing bank loan contracts. 
However, there is a long  existing literature shows that females are discriminated 
in  the credit m arket.  The  discrimination  hypothesis simply implies that banks  charge 
higher  loan price and require   tighter non-price term s  when lending to fe male  led 
companies because they are biased  against women. Empirically, most studies focus on 
small business firms and their results are m ixed (e.g., Blanchflower et al. (2003), Storey 
(2004) and Alesina et al. (2008)).  
We empirically examine this question. Using a sample of S&P 1,500 com panies 
from  1994-2006, we estim ate  how loan spread, lo an  maturity  and loan collateral are 9 
 
affected  by the gender of CFOs. Following  previous  studies, we control for firm 
characteristics and loan characteristics that are likely to shape loan contract terms. 
We find that gender of CFOs do affect ba nk loan contracts. Specifically, we find 
that in our sample, firms with female CFOs, on average, enjoy about 14 basis points 
lower bank loan price than firms with male CFOs. In addition, loans given to female CFO 
led companies have 9% (3.8 months) longer maturities and are about 8% less likely to be 
required to provide collateral  than loans given to m ale CFO led companies. The results 
support the hypothesis that banks  tend to recognize the role of  female CFOs in reducing 
information risk ex ante and default risk ex post, and reward firms with female CFOs 
more favorable loan contract terms. 
We also test whether fem ale CEOs and  other female top executives affect bank 
loan price. However, we do not find that th e presence of female CEOs and other female 
top executives affect both price and non-price  loan terms considered in our paper. The  
results suggest that banks view CFOs, but not  CEOs or other executives, as the primary 
executives  who determ ine  the qu ality  of  accounting  information  and the financing 
decisions of the firm s, and in tu rns, affect their lending decisions.  The results are also 
consistent with recent studies that find a strong relation between CFOs and the quality of 
accounting information and the leverage level of the firms (e.g., Geiger and North (2006), 
Matsunaga  and Yeung (2007), Peni (2008),   Huang and Kisgen (2010), Chava and 
Purnanandam (2010) and Jiang et al. (2010)). 
Endogeneity is a big concern in the study  of gender issue. For instance, Fe male 
CFOs may not be randomly assigned to firms. Firms having more favorable credit terms 
may  be m ore  likely to hire fem ale  CFOs.  In addition, unobservable tim e-variant  or 10 
 
invariant factors may be correlated with bank loans. Further, the causality problem makes 
our results hard to in terpret. To address the issue of  potential endogeneity, we em ploy a 
series of econometric analysis. First, we use a firm and year fixed effect regression to rule 
out the impact of potential unobservable time-invariant firm specific effects. Second, we 
use  a Heckm an  two-stage m odel  to contro l  for  self-section bias. Third, we apply a 
matching sample approach based on propensity score match method to control for sample 
selection bias. Finally, similar to Francis et al. (2010), we trace firm s who change their 
CFOs from male to female (treated group)  and from male to male (control group) and 
apply a differences-in-differences approach to mitigate unobservable time variant factors 
which could affect the estim ated influence of fem ale CFOs. Our results  are all rob ust, 
regardless of the econometric methods that we apply. The results of the differences-in-
differences approach also indicate that fe male CFOs bring about, and not m erely reflect, 
a reduced bank loan price and more favorable non-price loan terms. 
Our  research  is rela ted  to the lite rature  on the rela tion  between ac counting 
information and bank loan contracting. For ex ample, recent studies fin d that bank loan  
contract  terms  are affe cted  by accrual qual ity  (Bharath et al. (2008)), conservatism 
(Sunder  et al. (2009 )),  debt-contracting v alue  of accounting inform ation  (Ball et al.  
(2008)), internal control weakness (Schneider and Church  (2008), financial restatements 
(Graham et al. (2008)) and earni ngs predictability (Park and  Wu (2010)). In this paper, 
rather than focus on firm -level factors, we  firstly relate bank lendi ng decisions to the 
gender of top executives of borrowers and provide evidence that gender of CFOs also has 
a significant impact on bank loan contracting, thereby furthering our understanding of its 
determinants.  11 
 
Our paper also contributes to the gender  literature. Despite the proliferation of 
studies,  there  is still much debate as to  the  systematic  differences between m en  and 
women with regard to their  risk attitudes (e.g., Atkinson et  al. (2003) and Dwyer et al. 
(2002)). In this paper, by exam ining how informed private lenders, who are supposed to 
be very sensitive to the risk attitudes of top executives, react to the gender of CFOs when 
designing  bank loan contracts, w e  can gain   new insig ht  into wh ether  there  exits 
systematic  differences between m ale  and fe male  CFOs from   sophisticated investors’ 
perspective.  In additio n,  in our research des ign,  we comprehensively use different 
econometric methods to mitigate the potential endogeneity concern. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature 
and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 presents sample selection, summary statistics and 
univariate  comparisons.  The results of   multivariate  tests  are in Sec tion  4. The f inal 
section provides conclusions. 
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
Gender differences in attitudes towards risk and in risk related behavior have long 
been studied in the sociology, psychology and econom ics literatures.
3 In general, most 
studies support the notion that wo men are more risk averse than m en. Because of the 
dramatic increase of female executives on top m anagement teams over the past decade, 
more and more studies begin to investigate  whether the gender of top executives affects 
various  corporate decisions. For exam ple,  Huang and Kingen (2010) investigate how 
gender  of CFOs a ffects  corporate financial decisions. They find that firm s under the 
control of female CFOs are less likely to make significant acquisitions and are less likely 
                                                 
3 For a survey of gender difference in risk attitude in economic literature, see Eckel and Grossman (2003). 12 
 
to issue long term  debt. Furthermore, female CFOs are m ore likely to reduce leverage 
level  than m ale  CFOs. They also test m arket  reactions to acquisitio ns  and find that 
acquisitions made by female CFOs exhibit higher annou ncement returns compared to 
those made by firms with male CFOs. Their results provide so me supportive evidence 
that female CFOs are more risk- averse than male CFOs when m aking their financial 
decisions.  
Francis  et al. (2010) exam ine  the im pact  of gender of CFOs on accounting 
decision-making. By focusing on accounting cons ervatism, they find that fe male CFOs 
tend to report more conservative accounting numbers than their counterparts. They also 
examine  the linkage b etween  risk  aversion  of  female CFOs and corporate decisio n 
making. They find that female CFOs make less risky financing and investment decisions 
compared to their counterparts. Peni (2008) test the relation between earnings quality and 
the gender of top executives. She finds that  the gender of CFOs, but not CEOs or other 
executives affect earnings quality. Using a sa mple of listed Chinese firms, Wei and Xie 
(2009) find that female CFOs are less likely to manipulate earnings than male CFOs.  
In the bank loan literature, the default risk is the primary determinant of bank loan 
price, and banks always rely on accounting inform ation to assess the default risk of their 
borrowers, as accounting inform ation is the prim ary resource for banks to evaluate and 
predict riskiness of borrowers. Prior studies  find a negative relation between bank loan 
price and earnings quality (Bharath et al.  (2008)) and conservatism (Zhang (2008)). In 
addition, the capital structure decisions and ac quisition decisions directly related to the 
default risk of the firms. Prior studies find firms with higher leverage level and firms with 
higher takeover vulnerability have higher bank loan price (e.g., Strahan (1999) and Chava 13 
 
et  al. (2009)). Assuming fe male  CFOs  tend  to report higher quality and more 
conservative earnings than m ale CFOs, as in side lenders and delegated m onitors who 
concern about earnings quality and default  risk of their borrowers (e.g., Diamond (1984) 
and Fama (1985)), banks should recognize the gender differences of CFOs with regard to 
their  accounting and financing decision-m aking,  and reward firm s  with fe male  CFOs 
with lower bank loan price than firms with male CFOs. 
 
H1: All else being equal, firms under the control of female CFOs have lower bank loan 
price than firms under the control of male CFOs 
 
Bank loan contracts hav e multiple terms and they cannot b e treated separately 
(Melnik and Plaut (1986)). In addition, while interest rates are an effective way to “price” 
the  risk of bank loans, they have advers e  effects  on th e  moral  hazard prob lem  of 
borrowers  (Stiglitz and   Weiss  (1981)). In  reality,  banks are m ore  likely to set up 
customized contracts not only on price, but  also on non-price loan term s to price risk, 
facilitate monitoring and limit potential losses. Therefore, it is important to focus on both 
price and non-price terms when studying bank loan contracts (Qian and Strahan (2007)). 
Among different loan contract terms, loan  maturity and collateral are important 
non-price terms which are widely used by banks  to limit downside risk of lenders. For  
example, Barclay and Sm ith (1995) and Ra jan and Winton (1995) argue that shorter 
maturities is a useful way to solv e information problems because they can force more 
frequent information disclosure and tim ely renegotiation of contract terms. Berger and 
Udell (1990) and Jimenez et al (2006) show that lenders are more likely to use collateral 14 
 
when borrowers have higher information risk. Rajan and Winton (1995) discuss how the 
use of collateral affects banks’ incentives to monitor borrowers. As we expect that female 
CFOs affect both information risk ex ante and  default risk ex post, we expect that firm s 
with female CFOs should enjoy longer m aturities and are less likely  to be required to 
provide collateral in bank loan contracts. 
 
H2: All else being equal, firms under the control of female CFOs have longer loan 
maturities in bank loan contracts than firms under the control of male CFOs 
 
H3: All else being equal, firms under the control of female CFOs are less likely to be 




3.1 Sample selection 
The gender information is from ExecuComp database which covers most S&P 
1,500  public com panies.  S&P 1,500 include s  S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P 
SmallCap 600.
4 The bank loan inform ation is from the LPC Dealscan database, which 
contains historical bank loan data that ar e compiled from the SEC filings, self-reporting 
by  banks and its staff reporters. The basic unit of loans is facility, which is the 
fundamental  security that de signates  a loan in the loan   market.  The  LPC Dealscan 
database includes detailed deal  terms and conditions of loans, such as the interest rate, 
                                                 
4 S&P 1,500 public companies cover about 85% of the US equities market. 15 
 
loan  size, m aturity  and collateral. Beyond th ese  loan contract te rms,  Dealscan also 
includes information on the types of loans and the purposes of loans. 
The  accounting  information  is f rom  the  Compustat database. Follow ing  prior 
studies,  we exclude financial and utility co mpanies.  After  merging  the vario us  data 
sources,  the final sam ple  contains 9,680 f acility/year  observations obtained by 1,296 
firms from 1994 to 2006. 
5 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of  the key variables in our study. W e find 
that the mean values of female CFOs, female CEOs and other fem ale executives are 
0.049, 0.022 and 0.223, respectively. These number s show that the number of fem ale 
CFOs is more than twice as the number of fe male CEOs. Although the total number of 
female executives counts for over one fifth of  top executive members, the proportions of 
female CEOs and female CFOs are still relatively low.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
With regard to bank loa n characteristics, we find that the average lo an spread is 
128 basis points, ranging from  8 basis points  to 1,180 basis points. In our sam ple, the 
average loan amount is 774 m illion with the  mean maturity of 42 months. The loan 
amount and maturity vary considerably across  our sample. We also find that about 70% 
                                                 
5 Year 1992 and year 1993 are dropped because there is no female CFO in these two years in ExecuComp 
data. 16 
 
of loans use collateral (security) in our sam ple. The results of loan variables are very 
similar to those of Chava et al. (2009) and Francis et al. (2009). 
Table 1 also shows that the average value  of assets for our sam ple borrowers is 
9,955 million, ranging from a minimum of 14 million to a maximum of 750,507 million. 
The average market leverage ratio is 0.289,  the average tangibility is 0.342, the average 
profitability is 0.139 and the average Z-score  is 1.787. All of these firm variables also 
vary across our sample. 
Table 2 provides the Spearm an pair-wise correlations among the key variables. 
We find that female CFOs are significantly negatively correlated with bank loan spread 
and security, and are signif icantly positively correlated with bank loa n maturity. The 
results provide some preliminary evidence about the effect of female CFOs on bank loan 
contracts. However, because those loan terms are also significantly correlated with many 
other  loan and firm variable s,  it suggests that we need  to  analyze the relation in a 
multivariate environment.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 also shows that fe male CEOs, female CFOs and other female executives 
are all significantly positively correlated, sugge sting firms with female CEOs are more 
likely  to hire fe male  executives on the top m anagement  teams.  The result seem s 
consistent with the sim ilarity attraction principle (Westphal and Zajac (1995)), which 
says  that the appointment as a company ex ecutive  is influenced by the individuals’ 
similarity to the existing members of the executives. 17 
 
 
3.3 Univariate Comparisons 
Table  3 provides univariate com parisons  of  price and non price loan term s 
between firms with female CFOs and firm s without female CFOs. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find that the mean of bank loan spread for firms with female CFOs is 107 
basis  points, while it  is  129 basis points for f irms  without fem ale  CFOs. The m ean 
difference of 22 basis points is significant at the 1% level. We also find that the means of 
loan maturity and loan security are both significantly different between firms with female 
CFOs and firms without female CFOs. On av erage, loans for borrowers with female 
CFOs are less likely to be s ecured and have longer m aturities than loans for borrowers 
with male CFOs. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
While the univariate tests provide som e evidence to support our hypotheses, the 
results do not take into consideration poten tially fundamental differences in borrower 
characteristics and other loan characteristics between these two groups. Therefore, we 
also compare the borrower characteristics, loan types and loan purposes between  these 
two samples. We find that on average, firms with female CFOs have higher profitability, 
higher market to book ratio, but lower leverage  ratio than fir ms with male CFOs. The 
results are consistent with prior findings, such as Huang and Kisgen (2010) and Francis et 
al. (2010). 18 
 
In terms of loan types, we do not find  significant differences between these two 
sample firms. For loan purposes, w e find that loans for firms without female CFOs are 
more likely to be used for debt repay, recapit alization and takeover, and are less likely to 
be used for general corporate purpose compare to firms with female CFOs. 
In sum, the results of univariate tests s uggest that banks provide m ore favorable 
loan terms to borrowers with female CFOs. The results also show that some key borrower 
characteristics  and  loan characteristics   that  may  affect bank loan s  are s ignificantly 
different across sub-samples, which suggest th e need of controlling for those key firm 
and loan characteristics in the multivariate analysis.  
 
4. Results of multivariate tests 
In our multivariate regression tests, we begin by testing how female CFOs affect 
bank loan price. Next, we examine how female CFOs affect non-price loan terms. Further, 
we conduct a series of robus t checks by using different st atistical methods, including a 
Heckman  two-stage approach, a propensity  score  match  approach, a differences-in-
differences  approach and a fir m  level  analysis.  Finally, we  explore  through which 
channels  female  CFOs affect bank loan  contracting  by examining  how fe male  CFOs 
affect major firm characteristics.  
 
4.1 Female CFOs and bank loan price 
We first test how the presence of female CFOs impact bank loan price. The main 
empirical model follows: 
 19 
 
Log (Loan spread) = f (Female CFOs, Firm characteristics, Loan characteristics, 
Industry effects, Year effects)                                                                                             (1) 
 
In  the regression, the basi c  unit of observation is the loan facility, and the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Loan spread. To capture the effect of 
gender of CFOs, we defines a dum my variable, Female CFOs, which is equal to o ne if 
the loan is initiated to a firm with female CFOs, and zero otherwise. 
Following prior studies, such as those by  Qian and Strahan (2007), Bharath et al. 
(2008),  Graham  et al. (2008)  and  Francis et al. (2009), we   control for several firm 
characteristics that may affect the loan price in the regressions. Those factors include Log 
(assets), which is the n atural logarithm of a firm’s total assets; Leverage, which is the 
total debt (long term  debt plus debt in current liabilities)  divided by the total market 
assets (total debt plus to tal market value of equity); Profitability, which is the EBITDA 
divided by the total assets;  Tangibility, which is the net property, plant and equipm ent 
divided by the total assets; M/B, which is the market value of equity plus the book value  
of debt divided by the total assets; and Z-score, which is the modified Altman’s Z-score.
6 
Further, we employ one-digit SIC dummies to control for the potential differences in loan 
pricing across industries.
7  
We further control for loan characteristics that may affect loan contracting in the 
regressions. We include Log (facility), the natural logarithm of the a mount of a loan 
facility,  to m easure  loan size. Sharpe  (1990)  and Rajan (1992) em phasize  lock-up 
                                                 
6 Following Graham et al. (2008),  we use a modified Z-score, which does not include the ratio of the 
market value of equity to the book value of the total debt, because a similar term, market-to-book, is 
included in the regressions.  
7 Using two-digit SIC codes yields similar results.  20 
 
problems  associated with the existing lendi ng  relationship that subsequently increase 
borrowing costs. To control for previous lend ing relationships, we  construct a variable 
Prior relations, which is the tota l number of previous loans established by the sam e 
borrower and the same lead lender in the Dealscan database. Following Qian and Strahan 
(2007), we construct a loan rating score ba sed on Moody’s rating unless it is m issing, in 
which case we use the S&P rating.  Debt rating is a score that ranges from one to seven, 
with one indicating an  Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa  rating, three indicating an A 
rating, four indicating a Bbb ra ting, five indicating a Bb ra ting, six indicating a B rating 
or worse, and seven indicting no or missing debt rating. We also control for both the loan 
type effect and the loan purpose effect in our analysis. Following Francis et al. (2009), we 
separate loan types into  six categories: 364-day facility, Revolver  less than one year, 
Revolver  more  than one year, Revolver/Term   loan, Term   loan and others. For loan 
purposes, we separate loans into eleven  groups: Acquisition lines, CP backup, Corporate 
purpose, Debt repay, LBO/MBO, Recapitalization, Spinoff, Stock buyback, Takeover, 
Working capital and Others.  
As  the number of fem ale  CFOs  has  increased  dramatically  since 1994, one 
concern is that our s ample of female CFOs is heavily we ighted to the latte r part of the 
sample. For example, there are 330 female CFO observations in the 2002 to 2006 period 
while there are 144 female CFO observations in the 1994 to 2001 period. In addition, the 
average treasury rate is significantly di fferent between the 1994 to 2001 period and the 
2002 to 2006 period, suggesting dif ferent macro-level borrowing environments between 
these two periods. To mitigate this concern, we first add year dummy to control for year 
effect. Second, we add a dummy for the  2002 to 2006 period. Third, we construct a 21 
 
dummy variable called High treasury rate, which equals one if a loan is created on a day 




[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
In Column 1 of Table 4, we first test  how the presence of fem ale CFOs affects 
bank loan price by using an OLS regr ession. The estimated coefficient of Female CFOs 
equals -0.108 and is significan t at the 1% level, indicati ng firms with female CFOs, on 
average, have about 11% (abou t 14 basis points) lower bank  loan price than firms with 
male CFOs. Therefore, the effect of female CFOs on bank loan price is economically and 
statistically significant. 
In terms of control variables, our results are consistent with prior studies such as  
Qian and Strahan (2007), Bharath et al. (2008) , Graham et al. (2008) and Francis et al. 
(2009). Specifically, we find that Log (assets), Tangibility, Profitability, M/B and Z-score 
are all significantly negatively related to the lo an spread, while  Leverage is positively 
related to the loan spread,  suggesting firms with higher  information asymmetries and 
default risk have higher loan  price. We also find that  Log (facility) is negatively, while 
Prior relations and Debt rating are positively related to the loan spread.  
In previous OLS regression, although we  control for various observable firm and 
loan  characteristics which are wid ely  used  in  prior s tudies,  it is still poss ible  that 
unobservable  time-invariant  factors could aff ect  bank lo an  price. In addition,   it is  
common that a firm have several loan facilities each year, and those facilities may not be 
                                                 
8 We thank the referee for pointing this out to us. 22 
 
independent. Treating those correlated loans in dependently may overstate the statistical 
significance and lead to biased results. To d eal with these two issues, we perform a firm 
and year fixed regression with standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and within-
firm clustering. The results are in Column 2 of Table 4. We find after controlling for firm 
and year fixed effects, the  Female CFOs effect on bank loan price increases to 0.156 
from 0.108 (in Column 1), and it remains economically and statistically significant. 
As CEOs have the overall responsibilities of corporate decision-making, and prior 
studies find that CEOs’ individual styles affects firm policies and firm performance (e.g., 
Levi et al. (2008), Bertrand a nd Schoar (2003) and Bennedsen et al. (2006)), gender of 
CEOs may also affect lender’s p erceptions in their lending decisions. In Colum n 3 of 
Table 4, we further tes t whether the presence of female CEOs affects bank loan price. 
The results show that there is no significant relation between these two, indicating banks 
do not take consideration of the gender of CEOs when  pricing bank loans. The result is 
consistent with prior studies, such as Peni (2008) and Jiang et al. (2010), which show that 
CFOs have more impacts on earnings quality and earnings management than CEOs.   
We further test whether the pres ence of other female top executives affects bank 
loan price. The results in Column 4 of Table 4 show that other female top executives are 
not related to bank loan pri ce significantly. In Colum n 5 of Table 4, we specify three 
testing variables, Female CFOs, Female CEOs and Female other top executives, in one 
regression  simultaneously.  The resu lts  further confirm   that only  Female CFOs is 
significantly negatively related to bank loan price, and both  Female CEOs and Female 
other top executives have no impacts on bank loan price.
9  
                                                 
9 We test whether multicollinearity problems exist for all the regressions presented in this section. We find 
all the variance inflation factors (VIF) are far below the threshold indicator of 10. For example, the highest 23 
 
As we said before, the num ber of female CFO observations in the 2002 to 2006 
period is larger than that in the 1994 to 2001 period, and the borrowing environments are 
different between these two periods. Theref ore, we further exam ine whether the CFO 
gender effect on bank loan price holds for bot h sample periods. We separate our sample 
into two subsamples bases on the time periods, and then rerun firm and year fixed effect 
regressions for these tw o sub samples separately. The results are re ported in Column 6 
and Column 7 of Table 4. W e find that CFO gender effect on bank loan price holds for  
both subsamples, although the magnitudes of the coefficient for the 2002 to 2006 period 
sample is higher than that for the 1994 to 2001 period sample. 
10 
In sum, the results in Table 4 support th e hypothesis that banks tend to recognize 
benefits of female CFOs in providing more reliable accounting information ex ante and 
reducing default risk ex post, and grant firm s with female CFOs lower bank loan  price. 
The results also suggest that  banks only concern the gender  of CFOs, but not CE Os or 
other top executives when making their lending decisions.  
 
4.2 Female CFOs, loan maturity and loan collateral 
If female CFOs convey inform ation about disclosure quality and default risk of  
the firms, lenders might consider this factor not only on loan pric e, but also on other 
contract terms. Similar to Bharath et al. ( 2008), in this section, we focus on how fe male 
CFOs  impact  two m ajor  non-price loan cont ract  features: loan m aturity  and loan 
collateral. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
variance inflation factor (VIF) for model 1 of Table 4 is 3.01 (log assets), and the VIF for female CFOs is 
only 1.03. So it seems that multicollinearity is not a big issue in our multivariate analysis. 
10 The coefficients of female CFOs for the two subsamples are not significantly different. 24 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Column 1 of Table 5 reports the results  on the impact of female CFOs on loan 
maturity.  The dependent variable  is  the natural loga rithm  of  the  Loan maturity. 
Consistent with our Hypothesis 2, we find that the estimated coefficient of Female CFOs 
is 0.090 and is significant at the 1% level, indicating that loans given to firms with female 
CFOs have about 9% (3.8 months) longer maturities than loans given to firms with male 
CFOs. We also find that Female CEOs and Other female executives have no impact on 
loan maturity. In Column 2, we run firm and year fixed effect regression. Again we find 
that  the  estimated  coefficient  of  female  CFOs is still e conomically  and statistic ally 
significant.  
We further test the im pact of female CFOs on the likelihood of a loan being 
secured. We estimate a logit model where the dependent variable is  one if a loan is 
secured and zero otherwise.
11 The results are in Column 3 of Table 5. The marginal effect 
of Female CFOs implies that the probability of a loan being secured is about 8% lower 
for firms with female CFOs than for firms with male CFOs. 
12 This is consistent with our 
hypothesis that because of the in formation risk and default ri sk is lower in fem ale CFO 
led firms than in male CFO led firms, banks are less likely to require collateral in loan 
contracts  when  lending  to fe male  CFO led fi rms.  In addition, we s till  do no t  find 
significant impacts of Female CEOs and Other female executives on the likelihood of a 
loan being secured. 
                                                 
11 Because there are many missing observations about loan secured in Dealscan, the sample size for loan 
secured is smaller than other loan variables.  
12 The Female CFOs dummy coefficient of 0.389 translates into a 0.0775 marginal effect in the logit model.  25 
 
In sum, the results in Table 5 indicate that the firms with female CFOs enjoy more 
favorable non-price loan terms than firms with male CFOs, which is co nsistent with the 
literature that shows banks al ways simultaneously use both price and non-price terms to 
compensate for higher risk, facilitate monitoring and limit potential losses (e.g., Qian and 
Strahan (2007), Bharath et al. (2008), Graham et al. (2008) and Francis et al. (2009)). The 
results on the gender of CEOs and other t op executives also confirm that banks only 
consider the gender of CFOs, but not CEOs or other top executives, when designing bank 
loan contracts. 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
So far, we find that firms with female CFOs enjoy more favorable loan contract 
terms. However, endogeneity is a big concern in the study of gender issue. In this section, 
we perform robustness checks using different econometric analysis. 
The  first issue is the self selection  bias.  Female  CFOs may not be random ly 
assigned to firms. Firms having more favorable credit terms may be more likely to hire 
female CFOs. Therefore, a proper evaluation of  the effect of fe male CFOs on bank loan 
contracts should take into account the endogeneity of the choice of female CFOs. To deal 
with this issue, we first use a Heckman’s two-stage self-selection model to control for the 
self-selection bias induced in firms’ choices of female CFOs. 
In the first stage, we  run a probit regression. T he dependent variable is  Female 
CFOs. Similar to Huang and Kisgen (2010) and  Francis et al. (2010), we include fir m 
size, leverage, profitability, ta ngibility, market to book ratio  in the regression. W e also 
control for industry and year  effects. In the second stage,  we run OL S regression and 26 
 
logit regressions as Model 1 of Table 4 and Table 5 but include inverse Mills ratio, which 
is obtained from the first stage probit regre ssion, to control for  the endogeneity of the  
choice of female CFOs. Table 6 reports the results. We test Log (spread), Log (maturity) 
and Secured (dummy) as dependent variables in Colu mns 1, 2 and 3, respectively. W e 
find that the estimated coefficients of three Female CFOs in Column 1, 2 and 3 are -
0.1210, 0.089 and -0.4105 and are significant at the  1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively, 
suggesting our results hold after considering  the endogeneity of the choice of fem ale 
CFOs. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In  our sample, only around 5% firm s  have  female  CFOs. In order to fairly 
compare between two group firm s (male and female CFO led firm s), we construct a 
matched  male CFO firm s  by applying a pr opensity  score m atching  approach. The 
matching  begins with a logistic regressi on  of the fem ale  CFO dummy variable on 
industry, year, firm size and leverage. Then we use the prop ensity scores obtained from 
logistic estimation and perform a one to one  nearest neighbor match with replacement. 
This procedure ensures that each female CFO firm is paired with a male CFO firm. Then 
we obtain a new pooled sam ple which includes 356 observations with female CFOs and 
356 matched observations with male CFOs. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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The results are reported in Table 7. Similar to Table 6, we test  Log (spread), Log 
(maturity)  and  Secured (dummy)  as dependent variable s  in Columns 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively. We find that the estimated coefficients of three Female CFOs in Column 1, 
2 and 3 are -0.117, 0.098 and -0.589 and are significant at different levels. The propensity 
score matching approach results also confirm our prior findings and further mitigate the 
sample selection bias concern. 
As we use panel data in our studies,  unobservable time-variant factors may be 
correlated with bank loan terms, which would make our results spurious. To remove the 
effect of contemporaneous changes, we employ a differences-in-differences methodology. 
Similar to Francis et al. (2010), we first trace firms who change their CFOs from male to 
female (treated sample) and from male to male (control sample). We require each CFO 
should be in the offices for at least three  consecutive years excluding the transition year. 
We focus on how m ale to female CFO changes affect bank loan term s, using male to 
male CFO change firms as control group. Post is a dummy variable which equals one if a 
year is after CFO transition year an d zero if a year is b efore CFO transition y ear. The 
results are in Table 8. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
The first column shows the test with Log (spread) as the dependent variable. W e 
find that the estimated coefficient of Post, which captures the effect of male to male CFO 
transition  on  Log (spread),  is insignificant, indicating  that  there is   no significant 
differences of bank loan price b etween the pre-transition period and the post-transition 28 
 
period for the control group. The estim ated coefficient of the inter action term between 
Post and Female CFOs, which captures the incremental effect of male to female CFO 
transition on Log (spread), is -0.111 and is significant at the 1% level. Hence, compared 
to male CFOs, female CFOs reduce bank loan spread significantly after CFO transitions. 
Consistent results are also found in Colum n 2 and 3 when we use  Log (maturity) and 
Secured (dummy) as dependent variables. The result s of the differences-in-differences 
approach demonstrates that our findings about  the impact of female CFOs on bank loan 
contracts  hold  after  considering  time-variant  omitted  variable  bias. The results   also 
suggest that female CFOs bring about, and  not merely reflect, a reduced bank loan price  
and more favorable non-price loan terms.
13 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
In  our earlier analysis, the unit of observa tion  is individual loan. However, a 
borrower  can obtain several loans in the sam e  year and those loans m ay  not  be 
independent. Treating these loans independently may overstate statistical significance. To 
deal with this issue, we use a reduced sample in which we only keep one larges t loan for 
each firm each year. We rerun our main analysis using this firm level sample. The results 
are reported in Table 9. Although the sample size is reduced from 8986 to 5480, the main 
results are qualitatively unchanged.  
                                                 
13 We also consider the self selection issue in the di fference-in-difference analysis by control for inverse 
Mills  ratio  generated  from  Heckman’s  two-stage  self-selection  model.  The  results  are  qualitatively 
unchanged.  29 
 
In sum, Table 6, 7, 8 and 9 further confirm  our main finding that firms with 
female CFOs enjoy more favorable price and non-price loan terms, and the robust checks 
mitigate the potential endogeneity concern in the study. 
 
 
4.4 The impact of female CFOs on major firm characteristics  
In this paper, we establish our hypotheses based on recent studies which show that 
female  CFOs m ake  more conservative corpor ate  decisions, and consequently lead to 
more favorable bank loan contracts. In Table  3 univariate test, we find that firm s with 
female CFOs are m ore profitable, have highe r market to book rati o and lower leverage 
level than firms without female CFOs. However, we could not make the conclusion from 
Table 3 that female CFOs affect those firm characteristics, and subsequently affect bank 
loan contract terms, as we do not show a causal link between female CFOs and those firm 
factors.
14 
Although to examine the impact of gender of CFOs on various corporate decision-
making is not the focus of this paper, in this sub section, we try to provide some evidence 
to mitigate this causality concern. Similar to the robustness check in Table 8, we trace 
firms who change their CFOs from male to female and from male to male. Then we plot 
the main firm characteristics from three years before CFO transitions till three years after 
CFO transitions. In this way, we could gain a  visual sense of how firm characteristics are 
affected by CFO gender change. For com parison, we also plot the changes of the same  
variables for the male to male CFO transition sample. 
 
                                                 
14 We thank the referee for pointing this out to us. 30 
 
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1-1 shows leverage level three years before and three years after the CFO 
transition. We see male to female CFO transition-firms have higher leverage level than 
male to male CFO transition-firms in general. However, for male to female transition 
firms, we see a significant and continuous drop of leverage after female CFOs are hired. 
For male to male transition firms, leverage remains relatively stable after new male CFOs 
are hired. The finding shows that fem ale CFOs tend to reduce firm leverage level after 
they are hired, and it is consistent with  the finding by Huang and Kisgen (2010). Prior 
studies show that leverage is an important  indicator of firm risk, and firm s with higher 
leverage  level pay m ore  when they borro w  (e.g., Strahan (1999)  and  Graham  et al. 
(2008)). Here we provide a possible channe l through which fe male CFOs affect bank 
loan contracting.  
Figure 1-2 plots how m arket to book ra tio change following CFOs transitions. 
The trends of market to book ratio for the  firms belonging to the two different samples 
are  opposite. For m ale  to fe male  transition-firms,  it keeps increasing following the 
transition from male to female CFOs, while for male to male CFO transition-firms there 
is  a slight decline. The im pact  of fe male  CFOs on m arket  to book ratio also has 
implications  for bank loan contracting. Fr om  accounting perspective,   market  to book  
ratio  is a proxy for conservatism ,  with hi gher  market  to book ratio indicating more 
conservative accounting. Prior studies find that firms with more conservative accounting 
enjoy more favorable bank loan terms (Sunder et al. (2009)). 
15  
                                                 
15 From finance perspective, market to book ratio could implies either growth opportunity or opaqueness of 
the firm, and their implications for bank loans are opposite. 31 
 
Figure  1-3  shows th e  change  of  profitability  following  CFO tr ansitions. 
Consistent with the finding in Table 3, we find that in general male to female transition 
firms have higher profitability than male to male transition firms. However, the trends of 
profitability for two samples are very sim ilar. For both male to male firms and male to 
female firms, profitability keeps decreasing before CFO transitions. After CFO changes, 
profitability  increases  slowly  but not significantly. From   this  figure, we do not find 
obvious differences between male and female CFOs about their impact on profitability. 
However, we should notice that we could not  make the conclusion that fe male CFOs do 
not affect firm performance, as we do not provide a strong statistical analysis here. 
In Figure 1-4, we plot how tangibility  changes following CFO transitions. W e 
find  that before CFO t ransitions,  male  to  male  firms  seem  to have   higher level of 
tangibility than male to female firms. However, after new CFOs are hired, female CFOs 
increase the tangibility level con tinuously, while male CFOs tend to reduce tangib ility 
level  gradually.  This f igure  indicates  that f emale  CFOs are m ore  likely to inves t  in 
tangible assets than male CFOs. Tangibility  also has a ve ry important implication for 
bank  loan contracting, as tangible assets  are  critical for lende rs  to recove r  when 
borrowers default. Prior studies find a st rong negative relation between tangibility and 
cost of bank loans (e.g., Strahan (1999), Bharat h et al. (2008) and Graham et al. (2008)). 
Here we provide another possible channel th rough which female CFOs affect bank loan 
contracting. 
In general, Figure 1 shows that firm s under the control of female CFOs are more 
likely to invest in tangible assets, decrease leverage level and incr ease market to book 32 
 
ratio. These finding could som ehow help explain through which cha nnels that female 
CFOs affect bank loan contracting.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In  this pap er,  we exam ine  whether the gend er  of CFOs affects bank loan 
contracting. Based on recent empirical work which shows that female CFOs report more 
conservative and high-quality accounting numbers and are m ore likely to reduce ris k 
level of the fir ms, we hypothesize that as  inside lenders, banks should recognize the 
benefits of female CFOs in reducing information risk ex ante and default risk ex post, and 
reward borrowers with female CFOs with more favorable loan contract terms. 
Our empirical results support our hypothese s. We find that, in our sam ple, firms 
with female CFOs, on average, enjoy about 14  basis points lower ba nk loan price than 
firms with male CFOs. In addition, loans given to female CFO led companies have 3.8 
months longer maturities and are 8% less likely to be required to provide collateral than 
loans given to male CFO led companies. In addition, we do not find that the presence of 
female CEOs and other female executives affect bank loan contract terms, suggesting that 
banks view CFOs, but  not CEOs or other  executives, as the primary executives who 
determine  the quality of accounting infor mation,  and in   turns, affect their len ding 
decisions.  
We further comprehensively examine the potential endogeneity concern in our 
study.  We  perform  a firm   and year fixed e ffect  model,  a Heckm an  two-stage self 
selection model, a propensity score match method, a differences-in-differences approach 
and a firm level analysis to test potential issues such as un observable time variant and 33 
 
invariant omitted variable bias, self-section bias, causality problem and interdependence 
among individual loans. Our results hold to all these robustness checks. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one that links gender of CFOs 
and other top executives with banks’ lendi ng decision-making. The results further our 
understanding on the determinants of the cost of capital in general, and the cost of bank 
loan in particular. In addition, our paper tests the gender e ffect from the informed and 
sophisticated private lenders perspective, and provides some evidence on the debate as to 
the systematic differences between men and women with regard to their risk attitudes.  
However, we acknowledge that the results  of our paper should be considered in 
the context of its inherent limitations. First, although we find supportive evidence for our 
“risk-averse” hypothesis, we still cannot rule  out the “discrimination” hypothesis in the 
literature. Due to the data limitations, our study only focuses on large loans (at least one 
million  dollars)  granted to public com panies.  Discrimination  effect m ay  be  less 
prominent  in such kind of lending decisions .  Therefore, it is   hard  to gene ralize  our 
findings to small business loans and persona l  loans. Furthermore,  to examine  gender 
discrimination in the credit market, it is very important to focus not  only on the interest 
rates and other loan terms, but also on the av ailability of private debt financing, such as 
the denial rates of bank loans,  as denial rates are the first-stage evidence to test whether 
women are discriminated in the credit m arket. This may be another drawback in our 
study due to the data limitations. 
Second,  in our studies, as we do not  have  the detailed inform ation  about 
individual lenders who are in  charge of the lending decision-m aking, we only consider 
the gender effect of the borrowers, but not th e gender effect of the lenders. If the “risk 34 
 
averse” does exist between men and women, it is highly possible that m ale and female 
lending officers have different judgments on their lending decision-making. Therefore, a 
more  accurate research   design sho uld  simultaneously  take  into  consideration  of  the 
gender of both borrowers and lenders. 
Third, based on prior studies, we propose two possible explanations on why banks 
may care about the gender of CFOs in our paper. One is  the accounting information risk 
explanation and another is the default risk explanation. However, we do not know exactly 
which factor drives the observed gender effect. In addition, as  the research in the gender 
of  top executive s  is s till  in its e arly  stage,  there m ay  be som e  other alternative 
explanations for the observed effect of CFO gender that we  do not consider in our paper 
but are considered by lenders when m aking their decisions. For exam ple, the gender of 
CFOs may not only affect disc ount rate, but also im pact firms’ performance, which is 
also a primary factor that determines the cost of capital. Further research could examine 
the relation between female CFOs and firm performance and whether the public m arket 
recognizes the gender differences between m ale and female CFOs as well as other top 




•  Alesina, Alberto F., Francesca Lotti, and Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, 2008, Do women 
pay more for credit? Evidence from Italy, Unpublished working paper, NBER. 
•  Anderson,  Ronald C., Sattar A. Mansi, and David M. Reeb, 2004, Boar d 
characteristics,  accounting report integrit y,  and the cost of debt, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 37, 315-342. 
•  Armstrong,  Chris, W ayne  R. Guay, a nd  Joseph W eber,  2010, The   role of  
information and financial reporting in co rporate governance and debt contracting 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, 179-234. 
•  Atkinson, Stanley M., Sa mantha Boyce Baird, and Melissa B. Frye, 2003, Do 
female  mutual  fund managers m anage  differently?,  The Jour nal  of Financial 
Research 26, 1-18. 
•  Ball,  Ryan T, Robert M. Bushman, a nd  Florin P. Vasvari, 2008, The debt 
contracting value of accounting information and loan syndicate structure, Journal 
of Accounting Research 46, 247-287. 
•  Barclay,  Michael J., and Clifford W.  Smith,  1995, The m aturity  structure of  
corporate debt, Journal of Finance 50, 609-631. 
•  Bennedsen, Morten, Francisco Pérez-González, and Daniel Wolfenzon, 2006, Do 
CEOs matter?, Unpublished working paper, Copenhagen Business School. 
•  Berger, Allen N., and Gregory F. U dell, 1990, Collateral, loan quality, and bank 
risk, Journal of Monetary Economics 25, 21-42. 
•  Bertrand,  Marianne, and Antoinette Sc hoar,  2003, Managing with style: The 
effect of managers on firm policies, Quarterly Journal of Econom ics 118, 1169–
1208. 
•  Bharath, Sreedhar T., Jayanthi Sunder , and Shyam V. Sunder, 2008, Accounting 
quality and debt contracting, Accounting Review 83, 1-28. 
•  Blanchflower,  David G., Phillip B.   Levine,  and  David J. Zimmer man,  2003, 
Discrimination in the sm all-business credit  market,  Review of Economics and 
Statistics 85, 930-943. 
•  Chava,  Sudheer, Dm itry  Livdan, and Am iyatosh  K Purnanandam ,  2009, Do 
shareholder rights affect the cost of ba nk loans?, Review of Financial Studies 22, 
2973-3004  
•  Chava,  Sudheer, and Am iyatosh  Purnanandam, 2010, CEOs versus CFOs: 
Incentives and Corporate Policies, Journal of Financial Economics 97, 263-278. 
•  Diamond, Douglas W., 1984, Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring, 
The Review of Economic Studies 51, 393-414   
•  Dwyer, Peggy D., and Jam es H. Gilkeson, 1999, Gender differences in revealed 
risk taking: Evidence from mutual fund investors, Economics Letters 76, 151-158. 
•  Fama,  Eugene F., 1985, W hat’s  different  about banks? ,  Journal  of Monetary 
Economics 15, 29-39. 
•  Francis, Bill, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael  Koetter, and Qiang Wu, 2009, Corporate 
boards  and bank loan contracting, Unpub lished  working paper, R ensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute. 36 
 
•  Francis, Bill, Iftekhar Hasan, Jong C hool  Park, and Qiang W u,  2010, Gender 
differences  in financial reporting d ecision-making:  Evidence from   accounting 
conservatism, Working paper, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 
•  Francis, Jennifer, Ryan LaFond, Per  M. Olsson, and Katherine Schipper, 2004, 
Costs of equity and earnings attributes, Accounting Review 79, 967-1010. 
•  Geiger, Marshall A., and David S. Nort h, 2006, Does hiring a new CF O change 
things? An investigation of changes in discretionary accruals, Accounting Review 
81, 781–809. 
•  Graham, John R., Si Li, and Jiaping Qi u, 2008, Corporate misreporting and bank 
loan contracting, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 44-61. 
•  Huang, Jiekun, and Darren J. Kisgen, 2010, Gender and copoarte finance, Journal 
of Finance Forthcoming. 
•  Jiang, John (Xuefeng), Kathy R. Petr oni, and Isabel Yanyan W ang, 2010, CFOs 
and CEOs: Who has the m ost influence on earnings management?, Journal of 
Financial Economics Forthcoming. 
•  Jimenez,  Gabriel, Vicente Salas, and  Jesus  Saurina, 2006, Determ inants  of 
collateral, Journal of Financial Economics 81, 255-281. 
•  Matsunaga, Steven, and Eric Yeung, 2007,  Evidence on the im pact of a CEO's  
financial experience on the quality of the firm's financial reports and disclosures, 
Unpublished Working paper, University of Oregon. 
•  Melnik,  Arie, and Steven Plaut, 1986, Lo an  commitment  contracts, term s  of 
lending, and credit allocation, The Journal of Finance 41, 425-435. 
•  Park, Jong Chool, and Qiang Wu, 2010, Does earnings predictability matter in the 
private debt contracts?, Working Paper, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 
•  Peni,  Emilia,  2008, Do   female  directors  affect  earnings  quality?,  Unpublished 
working paper, University of Vaasa. 
•  Qian, Jun, and Philip E. Strahan, 2007, How law and institutions shape financial 
contracts: the case of bank loans, The Journal of Finance 62, 2803 - 2834. 
•  Rajan, Raghuram G., 1992, Insiders and out siders: the choice between Infor med 
and arm's-length debt, The Journal of Finance 47, 1367-1400. 
•  Rajan,  Raghuram  G., and Andrew W inton,  1995, Covenants and collateral as 
incentives to monitor, The Journal of Finance 50, 1113-1146. 
•  Schneider, Arnold, and Bryan K. Church,  2008, The effect of auditors’ internal 
control opinions on loan decisions, Journa l of Accounting and Public Policy 27, 
1-18. 
•  Sharpe,  Steven A., 1990, Asymmetric in formation,  bank lending and im plicit 
contracts: a stylized model of customer relationship, The Journal of Finance 45, 
1069–1087. 
•  Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Andrew Weiss,  1981, Credit rationing in m arkets with 
imperfect information, The American Economic Review 71, 393-410. 
•  Storey, D. J., 2004, Racial and gender di scrimination in the m icro firms credit 
market?: Evidence from trinidad and tobago, Small Business Economics 23, 401-
422. 
•  Strahan, Philip E., 1999, Borrower risk and the price and non-price terms of bank 
loans, Unpublished working paper, Boston College  37 
 
•  Sunder,  Jayanthi, Shyam V. Sunder,  and  Jingjing Zhang, 2009, Balance sheet 
conservatism  and debt contracting, U npublished  working paper, Northwestern 
University. 
•  Wei,  Zuobao, and Feixue Xie, 2009, CFO gender and earnings m anagement, 
Unpublished working paper, University of Texas at El Paso. 
•  Westphal, James D., and Edward J. Za jac, 1995, Who shall govern? CEO board 
power,  demographic sim ilarity,  and ne w  director selection, Administrative 
Science Quarterly 40, 60–83. 
•  Zhang,  Jieying,  2008, The contracting bene fits  of accoun ting  conservatism  to 
lenders and borrowers, Journal of Accounting and Economics 45, 27-54. 
 38 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Female CFO is a dummy variable which equals one if  a CFO is female and 
zero otherwise. Female CEO is a dummy variable which equals one if a CEO is female and zero otherwise. Other female executives is 
a dummy variable which equals one if  at least one  member of top management team (excluding CEO and CFO) is female and zero 
otherwise. Spread is the all-in spread drawn which is defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR 
equivalent for each dollar drawn down.  Facility is the total amount of loan facility. Maturity is the loan  maturity time. Secured is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a loan is secured by collateral, and zero otherwise. Debt rating is defined as rating score from 1 
to 7 with one indicating an Aaa r ating, two indicating an Aa r ating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb r ating, five 
indicating a Bb r ating, six indicating a B or  worse rating, and seven indicating no r ating. Prior relations is the total  number of 
previous loans initiated by the  same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. Assets is the total assets of the firm. Leverage is 
defined as total debt (long term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by total market assets (total debt plus total market value of 
equity). Tangibility is defined as the net pr operty, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA 
divided by total assets. M/B is defined as the  market value of equity p lus book value of  debt divided by total assets.  Z-score is 
modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. 
Number of observations (Obs.), mean, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), minimum (Min.) and maximum (Max.) are reported in the table. 
 
Variable   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Female CFO (dummy)  9680  0.049  0.212  0  1 
Female CEO (dummy)  9680  0.022  0.146  0  1 
Other female executives   9680  0.223  0.416  0  1 
Spread   9680  128  116  8  1180 
Facility (million)  9680  774  143  1  25000 
Maturity   9289  42  25  1  480 
Secured (dummy)  5471  0.704  0.456  0  1 
Debt rating   9680  5.257  1.611  1  7 
Prior relations  9680  2.952  3.485  0  43 
Assets (million)  9648  9955  34852  14  750507 
Leverage   9565  0.289  0.210  0  0.986 
Tangibility  9518  0.342  0.227  0.003  0.970 
Profitability   9613  0.139  0.087  -0.784  0.965 
M/B  9552  1.5075  1.591  0.031  46.628 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5 Female CFOs, loan maturity and loan collateral 
This table presents OLS, firm and year fixed effect and L ogit regressions results on the effect  of female CFOs on the maturity and 
collateral of bank  loans. The dependent variables are natural log of  maturity, which is the m aturity time (in month) of a loan,  and 
Secured, which is a dummy variable which equals one if a loan is secured by collateral and zero otherwise. Female CFO is a dummy 
variable which equals one if a CF O is female and zero otherwise. Female CEO is a dummy variable which equals one if a C EO is 
female and zero otherwise. Other female executives is a dummy variable which equals one if at least one member of top management 
team (excluding CEO and CFO) is female and zero otherwise. Log (assets) is natural log of the total assets of the firm . Leverage is 
defined as total debt (long term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by total market assets (total debt plus total market value of 
equity). Tangibility is defined as the net pr operty, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA 
divided by total assets. M/B is defined as the  market value of equity p lus book value of  debt divided by total assets.  Z-score is 
modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. 
Log (facility) is natural log of the tota l amount of loan facility. Prior relations is the total nu mber of previous loans initiated by the 
same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. Debt rating is defined as rating score from 1 to 7 with one indicating an Aaa rating, 
two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, five indicating a Bb rating, six indicating a B or 
worse rating, and seven indicating no rating. High treasury rate (dummy) is a dummy variable which equals one if a loan is created on 
a day where the one y ear treasury rate is above the  median rate for the entire sample period, and zero otherwise. Year 2002-2006 
(dummy) is dummy variable which equals one if a lo an is created after 2001, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for 
within-firm clustering. Absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics and z-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
(1)  (2)  (2) 
OLS 
Firm and year 
fixed effect  Logit 
Log (maturity)  Log (maturity)  Secured (dummy) 
Female executives   
Female CFO (dummy)  0.090***  0.086***  -0.389** 
[3.95]  [2.79]  [2.36] 
Female CEO (dummy)  -0.021  0.036  0.020 
[0.70]  [0.79]  [0.09] 
Other female executive (dummy)  -0.019  -0.010  -0.128 
[1.60]  [0.58]  [1.34] 
Firm characteristics    
Log (assets)  -0.024***  -0.015*  0.179*** 
[4.01]  [1.91]  [4.27] 
Leverage   -0.019  -0.113**  0.32 
[0.56]  [2.12]  [1.38] 
Tangibility   0.054**  0.236***  -0.136 
[2.09]  [2.70]  [0.62] 
Profitability   0.285***  0.146  1.075* 
[3.67]  [1.18]  [1.91] 
M/B  -0.005  -0.009  0.012 
[0.87]  [1.38]  [0.37] 
Z-score  0.012*  0.024*  -0.034 
[1.67]  [1.96]  [0.72] 
Loan characteristics   
Log (facility)  0.084***  0.062***  0.078* 
[12.22]  [9.06]  [1.87] 
Prior relations  -0.001  -0.001  0.002 
[0.81]  [0.15]  [0.16] 
Debt rating  -0.013***  -0.014***  0.954*** 46 
 
[3.90]  [2.90]  [27.22] 
Other controls   
High treasury rate (dummy)  0.018  0.025*  0.206** 
[1.38]  [1.72]  [2.00] 
Year 2002-2006 (dummy)  0.103***  0.105***  -0.173 
[3.57]  [3.24]  [0.77] 
Control for   
Industry effect  Y  N  Y 
Year effect  Y  Y  Y 
Loan type  Y  Y  Y 
Loan purpose  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  8561  8561  5075 
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Table 6: Female CFOs and bank loans: Heckman two-stage model results 
This table presents Heckman two-stage self selection models results on the effect of female CFOs on the price, maturity and collateral 
of bank loans. In the first stage, we run a probit regression by regress Female CFO on a set of firm characteristics. The table report 
second stage OLS and Logit regression results including inverse mills ratio. The dependent variables are natural log of spread, which 
is the all-in spread drawn defined as the a mount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar 
drawn down, natural log of maturity, which is the maturity time (in month) of a loan, and Secured, which is a dummy variable which 
equals one if a loan is secured by collateral and zero otherwise.  Female CFO is a du mmy variable which equals one if a CFO is 
female and zero otherwise. Log (assets) is natural log of the total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as total debt ( long term debt 
plus debt in current liabilities) divided by total market assets (total debt plus total market value of equity). Tangibility is defined as the 
net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided by total assets. M/B is defined 
as the market value of equity  plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which 
equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. Log (facility) is natural log of the t otal 
amount of loan facility. Prior relations is the total number of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in 
Dealscan. Debt rating is defined as  rating score from 1 to 7 with one in dicating an Aaa r ating, two indicating an Aa r ating, three 
indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, five indicating a Bb rating, six indicating a B or worse rating, and seven indicating 
no rating. High treasury rate (dummy) is a dummy variable which equals one if a loan is created on a day where the one year treasury 
rate is above the  median rate for the entire sample period, and zero otherwise. Year 2002-2006 (dummy) is dummy variable which 
equals one if a loan is created after 2001, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for within-firm clustering. Absolute values 
of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics and z-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated 
by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Log (spread)  Log (maturity)  Secured (dummy) 
Female CFO (dummy)  -0.110***  0.089***  -0.405** 
[4.09]  [3.90]  [2.47] 
Firm characteristics  
Log (assets)  -0.161***  -0.023***  0.181*** 
[19.46]  [3.92]  [4.33] 
Leverage   1.527***  -0.044  0.295 
[23.39]  [0.86]  [0.84] 
Tangibility   -0.212***  0.050*  -0.136 
[5.70]  [1.77]  [0.59] 
Profitability   -1.090***  0.362**  1.122 
[5.23]  [2.29]  [1.01] 
M/B  0.019***  -0.005  0.012 
[5.53]  [0.98]  [0.37] 
Z-score  -0.050***  0.009  -0.037 
[4.47]  [0.95]  [0.61] 
Loan characteristics 
Log (facility)  -0.064***  0.084***  0.078* 
[7.37]  [12.18]  [1.86] 
Prior relations  0.014***  -0.001  0.002 
[6.60]  [0.76]  [0.20] 
Debt rating  0.080***  -0.013***  0.954*** 
[17.05]  [3.87]  [27.26] 
Other controls 
High treasury rate (dummy)  -0.047***  0.017  0.203** 
[2.82]  [1.35]  [1.97] 
Year 2002-2006 (dummy)  -0.027  0.163  -0.116 48 
 
[0.20]  [1.57]  [0.16] 
Inverse mills ratio  -0.333***  0.059  0.064 
[2.67]  [0.62]  [0.10] 
Control for 
Industry effect  Y  Y  Y 
Year effect  Y  Y  Y 
Loan type  Y  Y  Y 
Loan purpose  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  8986  8561  5075 
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Table 7: Female CFOs and bank loans: Propensity score match results 
This table presents OLS and Logit regressions results on the effect of female CFOs on the price, maturity and collateral of bank loans 
by applying a propensity score matching approach. The matching begins with a logistic r egression of the  Female CFO on year 
industry, firm size and leverage. Then we use the propensity scores obtained from logistic estimation and perform a one to one nearest 
neighbor match with replacement. The dependent variables are natural log of spread, which is the all-in spread drawn defined as the 
amount the borrower pays in basis  points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down,  natural log of  maturity, 
which is the maturity time (in month) of a loan, and Secured, which is a dummy variable which equals one if a loan is  secured by 
collateral and zero otherwise.  Female CFO is a dummy variable which equals one if a CFO is female and zero otherwise. Log (assets) 
is natural log of the total assets of the firm. Leverage is defined as total debt (long term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by 
total market assets (total debt plus total market value of equity). Tangibility is defined as the net property, plant and equipment divided 
by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided by total assets. M/B is defined as the market value of equity plus book 
value of debt divided by  total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained 
earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. Log (facility) is natural log of the total amount of loan facility. Prior relations is the 
total number of previous loans initiated by the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. Debt rating is defined as rating score 
from 1 to 7 with one indicating an Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, 
five indicating a Bb rating, six indicating a B or worse rating, and seven indicating no rating. High treasury rate (dummy) is a dummy 
variable which equals one if a loan is created on a day where the one year treasury rate is above the median rate for the entire sample 
period, and zero otherwise. Year 2002-2006 (dummy) is dummy variable which equals one if  a loan is cr eated after 2001, and zero 
otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for within-firm clustering. Absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics and z-
statistics are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Log (spread)  Log (maturity)  Secured (dummy) 
Female CFO (dummy)  -0.117**  0.098***  -0.589* 
[2.41]  [2.60]  [1.90] 
Firm characteristics  
Log (assets)  -0.172***  -0.018  -0.037 
[7.38]  [0.91]  [0.27] 
Leverage   1.617***  -0.243**  1.928* 
[10.13]  [2.22]  [1.77] 
Tangibility   -0.420***  0.174  -0.683 
[3.11]  [1.56]  [0.94] 
Profitability   -0.847**  0.109  -0.169 
[2.41]  [0.37]  [0.07] 
M/B  0.036*  -0.007  0.172 
[1.66]  [0.38]  [0.85] 
Z-score  -0.083***  0.035  0.214 
[2.98]  [1.50]  [1.37] 
Loan characteristics 
Log (facility)  -0.094***  0.071***  0.162 
[3.75]  [3.35]  [1.08] 
Prior relations  0.007  -0.005  -0.01 
[0.95]  [0.72]  [0.23] 
Debt rating  0.061***  -0.013*  0.593*** 
[3.70]  [1.87]  [5.24] 
Other controls 
High treasury rate (dummy)  0.024  -0.02  0.362 
[0.40]  [0.40]  [0.91] 
Year 2002-2006 (dummy)  0.071  0.229  0.785 50 
 
[0.37]  [1.47]  [0.82] 
Control for 
Industry effect  Y  Y  Y 
Year effect  Y  Y  Y 
Loan type  Y  Y  Y 
Loan purpose  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  712  703  389 
Adjusted/ Pseudo R-squared  0.61  0.66  0.18 
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Table 8: Female CFOs and bank loans: Differences-in-differences regression results 
This table presents OLS and Logit regressions results on the effect of female CFOs on the price, maturity and collateral of bank loans 
by applying a differences-in-differences approach. We trace firms who change their CFOs from male to female (treated sample) and 
male to male (control group). We require each CFO has to be in office consecutively for at least 3 years excluding the transition year. 
The dependent variables are natural log of spread, which is the all-in spread drawn defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis 
points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn down, natural log of maturity, which is the maturity time (in month) of 
a loan, and  Secured, which is a du mmy variable which equals one i f a loan is secured by collatera l and zero otherwise.  Post is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a year is after CFO transition year and zero if a year is before CFO transition year. Female CFO 
is a dummy variable which equals one if a CFO is female and zero otherwise. Log (assets) is natural log of the total assets of the firm. 
Leverage is defined as total debt (long  term debt plus debt in current  liabilities) divided by total  market assets (total debt plus  total 
market value of equity). Tangibility is defined as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined 
as the EBITDA divided by total assets. M/B is defined as the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-
score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total 
assets. Log (facility) is natural log of the total amount of loan facility. Prior relations is the total number of previous loans initiated by 
the same firms and the same lead lenders in Dealscan. Debt rating is defined as rating score fr om 1 to 7 with one indicating an Aaa 
rating, two indicating an Aa rating, three indicating an A rating, four indicating a Bbb rating, five indicating a Bb rating, six indicating 
a B or worse rating, and seven indicating no r ating. High treasury rate (dummy) is a dummy variable which equals one if a lo an is 
created on a day where the one year treasury rate is above the median rate for the entire sample period, and zero otherwise. Year 2002-
2006 (dummy) is dummy variable which equals one if a loan is created after 2001, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for 
within-firm clustering. Absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics and z-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Log (spread)  Log (maturity)  Secured (dummy) 
Post (dummy)  0.010  0.010  0.035 
[0.27]  [0.40]  [0.17] 
Post*Female CFO  -0.111***  0.077***  -0.521** 
[2.64]  [2.85]  [2.26] 
Firm characteristics  
Log (assets)  -0.157***  -0.010  0.230** 
[9.70]  [0.87]  [2.54] 
Leverage   0.071**  0.005  0.297 
[2.08]  [0.15]  [1.50] 
Tangibility   -0.159  0.053  -1.008 
[0.62]  [0.34]  [0.78] 
Profitability   0.138*  0.064  0.711 
[1.82]  [1.23]  [1.58] 
M/B  -0.139***  -0.025  -0.286 
[3.84]  [0.79]  [1.33] 
Z-score  -0.187***  0.068***  0.001 
[8.00]  [4.63]  [0.01] 
Loan characteristics 
Log (facility)  -0.067***  0.063***  0.096 
[3.82]  [4.93]  [1.08] 
Prior relations  0.096***  0.004  1.065*** 
[10.41]  [1.15]  [15.67] 
Debt rating  0.033***  -0.014**  0.005 
[7.89]  [2.33]  [0.21] 
Other controls 
High treasury rate (dummy)  0.023  0.005  -0.226 52 
 
[0.66]  [0.20]  [1.15] 
Year 2002-2006 (dummy)  0.323***  0.142*  -0.186 
[3.40]  [1.82]  [0.41] 
Control for 
Industry effect  Y  Y  Y 
Year effect  Y  Y  Y 
Loan type  Y  Y  Y 
Loan purpose  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  2502  2405  1427 
Adjusted/ Pseudo R-squared  0.57  0.73  0.28 
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Table 9: Female CFOs and bank loans: Firm level regression results 
This table presents OLS and Logit regressions results on the effect of female CFOs on the price, maturity and collateral of bank loans 
using a reduced sample in which we only keep one largest loan f or each firm each year. The dependent variables are natural lo g of 
spread, which is the all-in spread drawn defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for 
each dollar drawn down, natural log of maturity, which is the maturity time (in month) of a loan, and Secured, which is a dummy 
variable which equals one if a loan is secured by collateral and zero otherwise.  Female CFO is a dummy variable which equals one if 
a CFO is female and zero otherwise. Log (assets) is natural log of the total assets of the firm . Leverage is defined as total debt (long  
term debt plus debt in current li abilities) divided by total market assets (total debt plus total market value of equity). Tangibility is 
defined as the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets Profitability is defined as the EBITDA divided by total assets. 
M/B is defined as the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. Z-score is modified Altman’s (1968) Z-
score which equals (1.2Working capital+1.4Retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999Sales) /Total assets. Log (facility) is natural log of 
the total amount of loan facility. Prior relations is the total nu mber of previous loans in itiated by the same firms and the same lead 
lenders in Dealscan. Debt rating is defined as rating score from 1 to 7 with one indicating an Aaa rating, two indicating an Aa rating, 
three indicating an A  rating, four indicating a Bbb r ating, five indicating a Bb rating, six indicating a B or  worse rating, and seven 
indicating no rating. High treasury rate (dummy) is a dummy variable which equals one if a loan is created o n a day where the one 
year treasury rate is above the  median rate for the entire sample period, and zero otherwise. Year 2002-2006 (dummy) is dummy 
variable which equals one if a loan is cr eated after 2001, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for within-firm clustering. 
Absolute values of the heter oskedasticity robust t-statistics and z-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%,  5%, and 1% 
levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Log (spread)  Log (maturity)  Secured (dummy) 
Female CFO (dummy)  -0.095***  0.093***  -0.345* 
[2.75]  [3.49]  [1.74] 
Firm characteristics  
Log (assets)  -0.163***  -0.021***  0.179*** 
[15.21]  [2.72]  [3.27] 
Leverage   1.399***  -0.006  1.245*** 
[25.74]  [0.13]  [3.85] 
Tangibility   -0.278***  0.058*  -0.186 
[6.24]  [1.75]  [0.67] 
Profitability   -0.484***  0.277***  0.994 
[3.65]  [2.86]  [1.33] 
M/B  0.016***  -0.009  0.111** 
[3.78]  [1.26]  [2.12] 
Z-score  -0.073***  0.019**  -0.016 
[6.02]  [2.27]  [0.28] 
Loan characteristics 
Log (facility)  -0.081***  0.095***  0.073 
[7.09]  [10.51]  [1.31] 
Prior relations  0.010***  -0.002  -0.016 
[3.48]  [0.76]  [1.10] 
Debt rating  0.078***  -0.008**  0.923*** 
[13.44]  [1.98]  [21.33] 
Other controls 
High treasury rate (dummy)  -0.039*  0.022  0.166 
[1.85]  [1.37]  [1.23] 
Year 2002-2006 (dummy)  0.235***  0.130***  0.575** 
[4.86]  [3.80]  [2.08] 54 
 
Control for 
Industry effect  Y  Y  Y 
Year effect  Y  Y  Y 
Loan type  Y  Y  Y 
Loan purpose  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  5480  5212  3117 
Adjusted/ Pseudo R-squared  0.60  0.70  0.21 
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